With the recent advances in computer networking applications, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are widely used to detect the malicious connections in computer networks. IDS provide a high level security between organizations while preventing misuses and intrusions in data communication through internet or any other network. Adherence to network usage policies is crucial since a system or network administrator needs to be informed whether the information is compromised, if the resources are appropriately used or if an attacker exploits a comprised service. Server flow authentication via protocol detection analyzes penetrations to a communication network. Generally, port numbers in the packet headers are used to detect the protocols. However, it is easy to re-map port numbers via proxies and changing the port number via compromised host services. Using port numbers may be misleading for a system administrator to understand the natural flow of communications through network. It is also difficult to understand the user behavior when the traffic is encrypted since there is only packet level information to be considered. In this paper, we present a novel approach via Hidden Markov Models to detect user behavior in network traffic. We perform the detection process on timing measures of packets. The results are promising and we obtained classification accuracies between %70 and %100.
Introduction
Server flow authentication is important to understand if a service is compromised or not in a system. In this paper, we try to solve the server flow authentication problem. The question is to detect the TCP application protocol information of a stream of data flowing in a system. In this way, the system administrator can analyze the resource utilization of the system, compromised services and unauthorized access to resources. The classical way is to inspect the source destination port mappings of client and server. Some of the well-known protocols like DNS uses port 53 and http uses port 80. Port label and traffic type relation is a common asset for intrusion detection 1 , 2 . Different attack scenarios may eliminate the usage of port numbers for protocol detection. As an example, proxies can be used to bypass network policies 4 . Proxy converts the port numbers of the garbage packets to valid port numbers. Thus, the system policies are invaded. Similarly, compromised services place a back door for the intruder to access control over the system resources. As an example ssh port can be compromised and the compromised service can redirect the packet to another port in case of connection failure. The attacker knows this property and arranges the functionality of the binary in order to use it both with ssh and other service. There are also some client installed programs working as a back door in the system. These are installed via peer to peer programs, viruses or trojans. It is difficult to understand the traffic if user installed applications are working as trojans or worms. In all of these scenarios, port numbers fail to detect the existence of a threat. The identification of the protocols might clarify the authentication of the server flows for all of these scenarios. Several studies were proposed for the detection of unauthorized services. File system integrity and intrusion evidences are checked by methods like Tripware 6 and Chkrootkit 5 . These tools suffer in terms of configuration difficulties. Moreover, the systems that these tools are working might be compromised. In that case, the reports of these tools are doubtful. Malicious software such as user installed malware may lead an unauthorized access to a computer and hide programs, processes, files etc. from the operating system. Some third party audit software might also be used to detect these misleading situation. However, there is still a risk that the server flows are not analyzed correctly. 21 , gesture recognition 23 , recognition of hand written texts 22 and bio informatics 24 . In this paper, we propose a new model based on HMMs to understand the anomalies in the network traffic and to detect whether there is a compromised service in the system or not. Section 2 presents the related work on the intrusion detection systems. Section 3 proposes our HMM for server flow authentication. Section 4 discusses our experimental results and finally on Section 5 we provide our concluding remarks and future work.
Related Work
Intrusion Detection is suggested as an approach to prevent unauthorized access to a system 12 . Most of the intrusion detection systems are not such dynamic to overwhelm misuses and anomalies. A system, program or person who tries to get unauthorized access to some system resources or who tries to break down system functionality is called an intruder 13 . Intrusion Detection Systems(IDS) try to detect the attempts to break down the system integrity and privacy, anomalies and unauthorized access to system resources 14 . IDS provides reports on system activity to help system administrators to understand abnormal situations.
Even though the genetic algorithms are mostly used in optimization problems 15 , they also have application areas in intrusion detection. Crosbie and Spafford 16 are the frontiers of genetic programming based approaches in intrusion detection. In their approach, they train different agents for each parameter to observe. Finally, these agents communicate with each other to detect intrusions. This approach has the problem of time consumption due to the improper initialization of agents. Goyal and Kumar 17 proposed a GA which can successfully classify smurf attack with high detection rates. HMMs 18 are used to detect misuses and anomalies 20 , 27 . HMM provides great success however it is computationally expensive. HMM is used in speech, text and image recognition 21 , 22 , 23 and bio informatics 24 . Complex internet attacks 25 , 26 are shown to be detected by non-probabilistic machine learning algorithms. Our approach differs from these applications in a way that it is one of the first approaches analyzing server flows to detect protocol information. In our approach, we try to detect protocol level information from time stamps of packets. There are some previous approaches to detect anomalies from server flows by decision trees 27 . If the server flows are encrypted, payload information of the packets are not sufficient. Packet header and traffic characteristics are processed to create a feature set. Several observations are made by previous works 28 . As an example, they claim that http packets contain psh flags rarely while telnet packets contain more often. Our approach is more different. We suggest to extract protocol information from information like packet sizes and time to transmit a packet. 
Hidden Markov Models for Server Flow Authentication
In this section, we explain our proposed HMM model and its implementation over training and test data. Wide Area Network Traffic Dataset of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 31 is used in our experiments.
Algorithm 1 Clustering Algorithm Used To Train Hidden Markov Model
Read training data centroidListALL = {} MeanValues = {} for each protocol p i in the list do centroidList ←− k-means algorithm(p i ) centroidListALL ←− centroidListALL ∪ centroidList calculate mean value m i for value distribution of p i MeanValues ←− m i end for Train HMM with MeanValues and centroidListALL.
We performed our experiments specifically on two type of features. These are the packet transmission duration and packet size. We first modelled a training data consisting of smtp, telnet, nntp, domain and login records. We used the k-means algorithm to cluster data and for each of the n protocols, k centroid values are found as stated in Algorithm 10.
Our System consists of 5 Markov Models for each protocol. Each of the protocols are represented by two states. These are the small packet and large packet states. Each state has n × k inner states representing a packet to be in each cluster. We categorized the packets as small or large with respect to their packet sizes. If a packet's size is larger than the mean of all training packets for a protocol, it is stated as large. Otherwise, it is a small packet. Figure 6 shows how each HMM is constructed.
Experiments and Results
In our experiments, we trained 5 Hidden Markov Models for each protocol. We used 25000 telnet, smtp, nntp, domain records and 5000 login records. We used two parameters: packet size and packet duration. We first analyzed the training data. We used k-means clustering and divided each training set to 9 clusters. For 5 protocols, 9 × 5 = 45 clusters are selected. We separated each group of packets as small and large packets. The states of the model represent whether a packet is small or large. Finally, 5 HMMs with two states and 45 clusters exist. Figure 1, Figure 2 , Figure 3 Figure 4 and Figure 5 show histograms for respective protocol data. We trained our HMM model with sequences of 100 packets. We provide an iteration number of 100 for Baum Welch Learner in our tests. We trained the HMM with test data first. Initial probabilities of the states are assumed to be equal. After having trained the HMMs the classification part of our algorithm looks at the packet sizes and the corresponding packet duration probabilities for each interval of respective protocols. If there are more than one protocol satisfying the criteria, the protocol with the highest probability corresponding to the duration interval is selected. We used duration and packet size parameters to detect protocols. These parameters were not successful to detect protocols exactly because some protocols dominate others in specific regions. Moreover, they can be transmitted for a long time interval overlapping with other protocols. Table 1 shows the confusion matrix and Table 2 shows the detection rates. The results are promising and an overall detection rate over %70 is provided.
Conclusion
Our approach worked in high accuracy for the detection of protocols. Most of the time, training HMMs may be problematic since there is not always enough information. Rare data problems may arise and HMMs may be trained unbalanced. We tried to train the models equally except login protocol. User behaviour needs to be modelled with more parameters than duration and packet size. Clustering the data in more than two dimensions may cause memorization of the cases for HMM. Our approach focuses on network based intrusion detection. Another alternative may be to detect intrusions computer based. Different threads may be used to detect ip based packet flows. This approach needs support by system administrator because users may change ip numbers if shut down happens in a period of time and restart later. System administrator may assign static ip numbers to each computer to pursue this case. Our approach is only restricted to protocol detection via information level data. Multistage attack patterns can also be detected with HMMs and multiple training methods can be developed for paralelizing HMM training procedure.
